The Phenomenon of Imitation (Taqlid) in Usuli Thought

Dr. Ruqayya Taha Jaber Al-Alwani [^1]

Introduction:

Imitation (Taqlid) is a phenomenon that has coincided with the existence of human societies across their various patterns and locations. As Ibn Khaldun states, imitation is an ancient and inherent trait in human beings. Jurists (Usuliyyun) have addressed the topic of Taqlid extensively, delving into its intricate details, related issues, the opinions of scholars, its boundaries, and its rulings. Some have also explored its horizons, dangers, and intellectual dimensions for both the individual and society. Collectively, these studies followed the path of legal theorization as a cognitive tool to understand and treat Taqlid. Consequently, the reference frame for most of these studies returned to a theoretical slogan revolving within the orbits of Fiqh (jurisprudence) and Usul (principles of jurisprudence).

Despite many writings addressing the gravity of this phenomenon and its numerous negative impacts, the majority did not focus on the stage of the phenomenon's emergence and its comparative historical and social circumstances in a comprehensive, independent study that sheds light on those factors. Since the causes of its appearance and the factors of its continuity were not revealed, the precursors of the remedy remained out of reach for many of these studies. The absence of the concept and necessity of focusing on the role of social and historical circumstances in the issue of Taqlid and others leads to falling into the corridors of theoretical tendency instead of resorting to a deep study of the reality of the phenomenon in society, and subsequently attempting to prescribe the appropriate treatment to overcome it.

Hence, this study comes as a serious, modest attempt to investigate and track the nature of the social conditions and the psychological and intellectual motives that contributed to establishing the foundations of the "imitative mentality"—one characterized by submission to ready-made viewpoints in understanding, judgment, and interpretation. This mentality laid the pillars of intellectual rumination, self-repetition, and revolving in the orbits of others without the ability to critique, analyze, or investigate, considering these to be fallible human efforts subject to error and correctness.

The disease of Taqlid began to spread in the mid-4th century AH (10th century AD), when the Ummah was exposed to various political, intellectual, and social factors that left profound effects and deep imprints on various aspects of life. Consequently, independent legal reasoning (Ijtihad) ceased, and work, authorship, and classification became centered around the opinions of the Imams of the four schools of thought (Madhahib) and other predecessor scholars—may Allah have mercy on them. The Fiqh of the predecessors became the anchor for every opinion, with hardly anyone deviating from its circle.

Accordingly, this study addresses the phenomenon of Taqlid during that era extending from the 4th century AH to approximately the 12th century, due to the similarity and overlap of conditions and factors specifically during that period. To reach an analysis of these factors and delve into their repercussions, the study adopts a multi-directional approach. It does not rely on a single-perspective method based solely on the Usuli and Fiqhi view of the concept; rather, the method expands to summon various social, psychological, and historical aspects to uncover the roots of this phenomenon and the reasons for its spread and continuity.

Among the most prominent results yielded by this study is that Taqlid has a deep social and psychological face that emerged within ideologized historical atmospheres, and that all forms of imitation and intellectual dependency are products of that accumulated meaning of Taqlid in the Muslim mindset. Taqlid is a fundamental issue affecting the meaning of the human being, their values, psychology, educational programs, relationships, and status in society. The study also revealed the importance of employing social circumstances and understanding them to encompass various phenomena, not just the phenomenon of Taqlid. Consequently, the study recommends the importance of researching the prevailing historical, social, scientific, and political causes when addressing many phenomena in our Islamic history, both ancient and modern.

Taqlid in Language:

Q-L-D: The necklace (qilada) around the neck. One "collared" him (qalladahu), so he wore the collar (taqallada). From this comes Taqlid in religion, the Taqlid (appointment) of governors to offices, and the Taqlid of the sacrificial animal (budna) by hanging something on its neck so it is known to be an offering [^2]. It is stated in Al-Ta'rifat: Taqlid consists of a person following another in what they say or do, believing it to be the truth without looking into or contemplating the evidence, as if this follower placed the words or actions of the other as a necklace (qilada) around their neck. Thus, it is the acceptance of another's statement without proof or evidence [^3].

Taqlid in Technical Terms:

It is clear from the statements of the Usuliyyun regarding Taqlid and its ruling that the prevalent definition among the early scholars of Usul and Fiqh is: Taking the opinion of another without knowing their evidence. Or, it is acting upon the statement of another without proof [^4].

However, this definition was not free from objections by several scholars, including Imam al-Haramayn al-Juwayni (478 AH) and others. He explained in his book Al-Ijtihad that this definition is not considered Taqlid in the general, common sense discussed by scholars, insofar as the imitation of a scholar and his statement is a proof (hujjah) for the one who asks and seeks a fatwa from him; thus, it exits the concept and circle of Taqlid. He says regarding this: "...that is not Taqlid at all, for the scholar's word is a proof for the petitioner (mustafti); since the Lord, Exalted and Majestic, established the scholar's word as a sign ('alam) for the commoner and made it obligatory for him to act upon it, just as He made it obligatory for the scholar to act according to his Ijtihad. His Ijtihad is a sign for his knowledge, and his word is a sign for the petitioner. From this principle, it follows that what we approve of (meaning Taqlid) is not conceivable as permissible in the Sharia, neither in the foundations of religion (Usul al-Din) nor its branches (Furu'); for Taqlid is following that which has no proof established for it..." [^5].

Abu al-Muzaffar al-Sam'ani (489 AH) also cited the opinion of some scholars that the commoner's recourse to the scholar's word is not Taqlid either, because it requires a type of Ijtihad (effort), so it is not Taqlid [^6]. He also transmitted the opinion of Imam al-Shafi'i (204 AH) in some places that Taqlid is not permissible for anyone except the Messenger ﷺ, but he commented that this is mentioned by way of expansion (tawassu'), not literal truth [^7][^8]. Al-Qadi [Abu Bakr al-Baqillani] in Al-Taqrib reported a consensus (Ijma') that taking the statement of the Prophet ﷺ and referring to him is not being a muqallid (imitator), but rather proceeding toward evidence and certain knowledge. Imam al-Haramayn also mentioned that the disagreement occurring in this matter is a disagreement in phrasing that is of minor consequence [^9].

Hence, several Usuliyyun placed restrictions on the definition of Taqlid to prevent the inclusion of what does not belong to the concept. Al-Shawkani cited those definitions, the gist of which is that Taqlid is: Accepting the opinion of one whose statement does not constitute a proof, without proof. This excludes acting upon the statement of the Messenger ﷺ, acting upon consensus (Ijma'), the commoner's recourse to the mufti, and the judge's recourse to the testimony of upright witnesses, for proof has been established for these [^10].

Taqlid took a more restricted path than that concept when it began to be used by later scholars to mean: Adopting the statements of a specific man as being in the position of the Lawgiver's texts, not paying attention to the words of anyone else, nor even to the texts of the Lawgiver, unless they agree with the texts of the one followed. Abu Shama al-Maqdisi (665 AH) says regarding this: "In the latter times, the writings of the two Sheikhs, Abu Ishaq al-Shirazi and Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, became famous in the Shafi'i school. People devoted themselves to studying them, and partisans for them increased, until the advanced scholar would see their texts as being like the texts of the Book and the Sunnah, not seeing any way to depart from them. Even if informed of texts from other Imams of his school to the contrary, he would not pay them any attention..." [^11].

Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (751 AH) says after citing this specific concept of Taqlid: "This is the Taqlid that the Ummah has agreed is forbidden in the religion of Allah, and it did not appear in the Ummah until after the expiration of the virtuous centuries" [^12]. He says in another place in his book, emphasizing the occurrence of Taqlid in this sense: "What occurred in Islam after the passing of the virtuous centuries, in the fourth century—which was censured by the tongue of the Messenger of Allah ﷺ—was the setting up of a single man and making his fatwas like the texts of the Lawgiver, rather, giving them precedence over them, and giving his word precedence over the words of all the scholars of his Ummah who came after the Messenger of Allah ﷺ, and sufficing with his Taqlid instead of receiving rulings from the Book of Allah, the Sunnah of His Messenger, and the statements of the Companions" [^13].

Al-Shawkani (1255 AH) clarified this meaning, saying: "Among the most wondrous negligence and greatest distraction from the truth is the imitators' choice of men's opinions despite the existence of the Book of Allah, the Sunnah of His Messenger, the existence of those from whom they can take them, and the existence of the faculty of understanding and the power of reason within them" [^14]. These imitators among the people of Islam replaced the Book of Allah and the Sunnah of His Messenger with a book in which the Ijtihad of one of the scholars of Islam was recorded [^15]. He says in another place: "Taqlid and affiliation to one scholar among others, and restricting oneself to everything he brought of narration and opinion while neglecting everything else, is among the greatest innovations (bid'a) that lead astray and the most desolate calamities that have occurred in this Islamic nation" [^16].

There is no contradiction or conflict in the scholars' definitions of Taqlid. Terms, in general, are subject to change, alteration, and development according to linguistic status and usage conventions, which is unavoidable. Concepts and terms undergo a series of changes that lead to a type of specification and definition. What confirms the path of later scholars in defining Taqlid are their statements in which they attacked Taqlid, fought it fiercely, and held it to be absolutely impermissible. Meanwhile, the earlier scholars addressed the distinction between Taqlid in branches (furu') versus creeds ('aqa'id) and foundations (usul), based on their definition of it in their time, not based on what would emerge later and be defined by the later scholars. The intended meaning of Taqlid in this study is Taqlid in the convention of the later scholars, which is what is referred to and derived from the writings of Ibn al-Qayyim, al-Shawkani, and other scholars who attacked Taqlid and the muqallidin. Reading the works of Ibn al-Qayyim, al-Shawkani, al-San'ani, and others confirms the link between that concept and this specific name.

The Ruling on Taqlid in Usuli Writings:

Before proceeding to investigate and track the ruling on Taqlid in the writings of scholars, several matters must be emphasized, including:
The prevalence of Taqlid in the sense adopted by this study does not necessarily mean that various eras and historical periods were entirely devoid of mujtahids. Many scholars appeared who opposed the traditionalist method, attacked it, and fought it in their various writings, but it means the dominance of Taqlid and the prevalence of its current. Furthermore, Taqlid does not happen suddenly or over short periods; rather, its tributaries gather and collaborate over long historical times. Additionally, Taqlid is not caused by a single factor; rather, it is the product of a set of overlapping factors to a degree that it is often difficult to decouple them to track the extent of each one's influence separately. The phenomenon of Taqlid forms slowly, and various social, psychological, and political influences collaborate in its formulation and continuity.

Accordingly, a single-factor view to explain this phenomenon or an attempt to attribute it to one influence is something that should be bypassed and replaced by an attempt to provide a holistic view concerned with investigating and tracking various factors and influences. Moreover, Taqlid as a phenomenon is not linked to a specific historical stage; rather, this phenomenon emerges whenever its repercussions and causes are renewed.

The early Usuliyyun addressed the ruling on Taqlid according to their concept of it at that time, and thus they moved toward differentiation and distinction in ruling upon it in different matters. As for the Taqlid whose concept this study adopts, there is no disagreement regarding its prohibition [^17]. Their disagreement regarding the ruling of Taqlid was confined to practical legal rulings or branches (furu'). The majority of Usuliyyun hold that Taqlid in them is permissible, because the mujtahid in them is either correct or mistaken but rewarded and not sinful, so Taqlid was permitted in them. Burdening the commoners with the rank of Ijtihad would lead to the disruption of crafts, industries, and various interests. However, a number of scholars, such as Ibn Abd al-Barr, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, al-Shawkani, and others, forbade it [^18].

A number of scholars and mujtahids across various ages held the prohibition and invalidation of Taqlid—in the sense adopted by this study—due to its disastrous effects on the individual, society, and their intellectual path. It is a reinforcement of the meaning of absolute dependency which Islam forbade, in addition to the effect of this phenomenon in disabling the powers of the mind and its abilities for Ijtihad, innovation, renewal, and contribution. These scholars proceeded in their prohibition of the imitative path through their understanding of the Quranic texts that collectively prohibit it. Among these texts are the following:

• The Almighty's saying: {And [yet], among the people are those who take other than Allah as equals [to Him]. They love them as they [should] love Allah} [Al-Baqarah: 165]. Al-Qurtubi says in his exegesis: "In this is evidence for the command to use rational proofs and the invalidation of Taqlid..." [^19]
• The Almighty's saying: {And when it is said to them, "Come to what Allah has revealed and to the Messenger," they say, "Sufficient for us is that upon which we found our fathers"} [Al-Ma'idah: 104]. Al-Shawkani says in its exegesis: "In that is evidence for the ugliness of Taqlid, its prohibition, and that investigation is what is required" [^20]. Al-Shawkani dedicated an independent work titled: Al-Qawl al-Mufid fi Hukm al-Taqlid (The Beneficial Statement on the Ruling of Imitation) to research Taqlid and emphasize its invalidation and prohibition.
• The Almighty's saying: {They have taken their scholars and monks as lords besides Allah} [At-Tawbah: 31]. Al-Shawkani says: "In this verse is that which restrains whoever has a heart or gives ear while he is a witness from Taqlid in the religion of Allah and preferring what the predecessors say over what is in the Mighty Book and the Pure Sunnah. For the partisan's obedience to the one whose word he follows and whose way he adopts among the scholars of this Ummah—while contradicting what the texts brought, what Allah's proofs and evidences established, and what His books and prophets spoke—is like the Jews and Christians taking scholars and monks as lords besides Allah; for it is certain that they did not worship them, but rather obeyed them, forbidding what they forbade and permitting what they permitted, and this is the conduct of the imitators of this Ummah" [^21].

• Al-Shawkani cited many Quranic texts showing the Quran's approach in censuring the imitation of fathers and leaders, emphasizing that scholars used as evidence some verses revealed in the context of rebuking disbelievers and polytheists for their imitation of fathers and ancestors. However, the disbelief of those does not prevent using them as evidence; the comparison did not occur from the perspective of the disbelief of one and the faith of the other, but rather the comparison occurred between imitators without proof for the one imitated. Just as if one imitated a man and disbelieved, and another imitated and sinned, and another imitated in a matter and missed its correct face, each would be blamed for Taqlid without proof; because all of that is Taqlid that resembles one another, even if the sins in it differ [^22].

• What was narrated from Umar (may Allah be pleased with him) where he says: "Your speech is the worst of speech, and your words are the worst of words, for you have spoken to people until it is said: 'So-and-so said' and 'So-and-so said,' and the Book of Allah is abandoned. Whoever among you stands, let him stand by the Book of Allah, otherwise let him sit." This was Umar's statement to the best generation on the face of the earth; so how if he had realized what we have become, of abandoning the Book of Allah for the word of so-and-so and so-and-so?" [^23].

• Ibn Hazm stated the consensus on the prohibition of Taqlid. He narrated from Malik that he said: "I am a human being; I err and I am correct, so look into my opinion: whatever agrees with the Book and the Sunnah, take it, and whatever does not agree, leave it." Likewise al-Shafi'i and Abu Hanifa. Thus, the prohibition of Taqlid, if not a consensus, is the school of the majority [^24].

• Scholars deduced some rational proofs to reject Taqlid and forbid it. Among them is the imitator's argument of lack of knowledge and lack of encompassment of the interpretation of the Book of Allah and the Sunnah of His Messenger ﷺ, while the scholar he imitates has known that. This is, in reality, a type of unjustified rationalization; they try to justify their imitation and their inability to look, research, and exert effort with this statement. The fact is that scholars disagreed among themselves and did not agree on a single interpretation; had they agreed, that would be the truth. Thus, there is no justification for following some of them over others when all of them are scholars [^25].

• The four Imams forbade imitating them and censured those who took their words without knowledge of the proof. Ibn al-Qayyim says in this context: "The four Imams prevented people from imitating them, and Allah, Glorified and Exalted, did not make it obligatory for anyone to imitate any of the Companions or the Successors (Tabi'un) who are the role models of the Ummah, its Imams, and its predecessors, let alone the mujtahids and individual people of knowledge. Rather, the obligation upon everyone is to follow what the Book and the Pure Sunnah brought. Taqlid of mujtahids was only needed because the authentic hadiths and reports were not compiled, but now, praise be to Allah, the people of knowledge of the Sunan have compiled the science of the hadith of the Messenger of Allah ﷺ and made people independent of others. So may Allah not greet a servant who imitated and did not follow, and did not know the value of the Sunnah and praised Taqlid" [^26].

Ibn al-Qayyim elaborated on the refutation of imitators and the censure of Taqlid in his book I'lam al-Muwaqqi'in 'an Rabb al-'Alamin in various places, especially in a specific chapter he titled: "On holding a debate council between an imitator and a possessor of proof submissive to the truth wherever it may be." The aspects of invalidating Taqlid reached more than eighty points.

One who contemplates the Usuli writings of the early scholars notices their lack of addressing Taqlid and its ruling according to this concept, which is something that has its justification; for Taqlid with this concept and the repercussions that accompanied it did not appear until a later stage (as appears from the writings of the later scholars). Accordingly, their lack of addressing the discussion of its prohibition or prevention or similar evidence is understood. Since the concept had not appeared with that restriction, there was no need to address or study it. Usuli and Fiqhi studies in their eras were a reflection of their reality and a mirror of their societies and phenomena, not a type of assumption or expectation, but rather echoes of reality and its outputs.

The Roots of Taqlid and its Historical Emergence in Islamic Thought:

It is perhaps superfluous to emphasize that Taqlid as an intellectual and social phenomenon does not mean absolute imitation or total, general, comprehensive dependency for everyone. Muslim societies, in various successive periods and eras, continued to produce, amidst their intellectual trials, scholars and mujtahids who departed from the path of sweeping imitation and its general trend. However, the dominant feature and the prevailing current in society was leaning toward Taqlid as a method and path. This trend was not born of its day and hour; rather, it resulted from many factors, and a set of circumstances and events overlapped in its formulation, all of which collaborated over historical periods that extended in the history of the Ummah.

The Muslim mentality in the first virtuous eras followed a sound intellectual path in reaching sciences, truths, and rulings of various issues. The Holy Quran and the authentic Sunnah narrated from the Prophet ﷺ were the governing, dominant balance over all methods, regulating them; no opinion, rationalization, imitation, or analogy was given precedence over them [^27]. Thus emerged the mature mentality distant from partisanship to persons, standing with proof and deduction, traveling with the truth wherever its caravans traveled, independent with correctness wherever its camps were pitched. That mentality which, whenever evidence appeared to it, took it and followed its path. A mentality whose foundations and methods of thinking were established by the Holy Quran and the teachings of the Prophetic Sunnah, making them a standard for different methods and a scale by which to weigh various schools of thought. Accordingly, methods of despotism of opinion, fanaticism, or the denial of intellectual pluralism did not appear in any form. Prince al-San'ani (1182 AH) says regarding this: "It is inconceivable that an Imam among the great Imams, no matter how much knowledge, memorization, precision, mastery, virtue, and prestige he reached, would act independently in judging a thing, be despotic in his opinion, and impose it on others" [^28].

In those free atmospheres, society entered into a massive jurisprudential and social movement. Scholars met the needs of societies through their Ijtihad and opinions interacting with reality and its increasing developments, according to the method of the Quran and Sunnah. Thus, the scientific movement flourished and its fruits ripened in a number of schools and intellectual methods following the path of Prophethood and Message. The first Abbasid era (132 AH - 232 AH) was the era of creativity in Islamic civilization. There were many factors for the spread and flourishing of that massive scientific movement, most importantly the Caliphs' interest in science and scholars, and directing special attention to knowledge. They brought scholars close and elevated their status in society [^29], and dedicated councils for science and debate. Many scholars excelled in various fields of science and knowledge, and the mujtahid Imams appeared; thus, the movement of compilation flourished in various scientific branches [^30]. The expansion of the Islamic state's territory, the abundance of its wealth, and the stability of its economies had a profound effect on creating that scientific and cultural renaissance, which the entire East had never witnessed before, until all people in those atmospheres seemed to be students of knowledge and its supporters [^31].

Combining Ijtihad in Sharia sciences and Fiqh issues with creativity in natural sciences was the habit of scholars and students of knowledge. Thus was the success achieved by Muslims in various fields of science and knowledge, and Islamic civilization became the result of an integrative interaction between the study of natural sciences and Sharia sciences without any separation between them. This fact could not be denied by the Orientalist Goldziher when he said: "Likewise, what the theologian of the modern church (Peter Werenfels) said about the Gospel applies to the Quran: every man seeks his creeds in this Holy Book, and every man finds in it specifically what he seeks" [^32]. The scientist of nature and physics in his laboratory, and the scholar of Sharia in his issues and fatwas... all find their goal in the Holy Quran. Likewise, the Orientalist (Horten), professor of Semitic philology at the University of Bonn, realized the Muslims' ability for intellectual cross-pollination and openness to the civilizations and cultures of other nations with the ability to keep the teachings of the Holy Quran and Sunnah dominant, judging and governing all of that in a cognitive pattern of rare example [^33].

Thus, Fiqh became one of the greatest sciences that witnessed a massive expansion in research and codification during the virtuous centuries. Fiqh absorbed intellectual energies to the extent of forming no less than nineteen schools of jurisprudence from approximately the middle of the first century to the beginning of the fourth century AH [^34]. Al-Maqdisi (665 AH) says: "Those times were filled with mujtahids; every class according to what it saw, following one another, drawing from the two sources, the Book and the Sunnah, and preferring the weightier of the various statements of the predecessors without whim. The matter remained as I described until the codified schools settled" [^35].

However, the winds of change began to blow on the Muslim society little by little. Fitnas (tribulations), political fluctuations, and social changes played their role in opening the way for a number of social and intellectual diseases in society. People tended toward total devotion to the world and complete preoccupation with its material pleasures, excelling in ways of enjoying them until the spirit of futility and decadence spread among many individuals and classes of society. This stage reached by society is what Ibn Khaldun referred to in his Muqaddimah and called the stage of "leisure and tranquility" to reap the fruits of kingship which human natures incline toward. If a human being is corrupted in his ability regarding his character and religion, his humanity is corrupted and he becomes a literal monstrosity [^36].

Political and geographical fragmentations that scattered the Caliphate state into fragmented mini-states contributed to accelerating the spread and penetration of those ailments into society on a wide scale. Also, the Shu'ubiyya movements that began to penetrate and spread in the Abbasid era contributed to the emergence and aggravation of various social and intellectual diseases, carrying with them manifestations of moral recession and heresy (zandaqa), contrary to all values, behaviors, and moral manifestations upon which society was raised [^37].

Violent reactions emerged from scholars and the general public toward those manifestations and clear indicators of moral corruption in society, embodied in a number of confrontational stances between scholars and those in power and rulers. Many scholars fought those manifestations violently, which appears clearly in their various writings about social manifestations, intellectual diseases, and skeptical tendencies that the Muslim society had not known before; however, they were echoes of interaction with their reality then, and a true mirror reflecting the size of the challenges they stood to face [^38].

Those factors combined for their negative effects to be reflected on the atmosphere of the scientific and cultural movement, creating a deep chasm that increased with the passage of days and succession of generations between the political and intellectual leadership in the Muslim society. The fondness for abstract theorization, rational contemplations, and logical analogy spread, and the scientific manifestations that characterized previous eras were neglected, announcing the beginning of paralysis in scientific, economic, and social life alike. The ordeal reached its peak with the Mongol sweep of Baghdad and the destruction of the capital of the Islamic Caliphate in 656 AH. Despite the emergence of a number of mujtahid mentalities amidst those eras and trials, which refused to settle for Taqlid and continue in processes of intellectual rumination, they remained dissolved traces in the massive fabric of Taqlid [^39].

These factors combined to produce a self-absorbed mentality, seeking protection behind the walls of Taqlid to preserve the remaining remnants of its heritage threatened by erosion and erasure of identity. The Muslim mentality took the path of presumption (istishab) and repetition of various topics and issues addressed by previous scholars, thus distancing itself from reality and beginning to move within the space of theorization, abstraction, and hypotheses. The aforementioned political, social, and intellectual factors played their role in reinforcing the psychology prone to retreating into the old. Mentalities that opposed the Ijtihad path and deviated from it emerged, seeing in pure Taqlid a path worthy of following, until Taqlid and fanaticism became the habit of many, and it became a phenomenon whose gravity scholars spoke of and whose pests the wise struggled against [^40].

A group of scholars holds that the innovation of Taqlid occurred specifically in the fourth century AH, which is the same time some scholars announced the closing of the door of Ijtihad [^41]. Al-San'ani (1182 AH) says in his book Irshad al-Nuqqad ila Taysir al-Ijtihad: "Islamic Fiqh in the centuries witnessed for goodness was in continuous flourish, constant growth, and permanent progress. The Ijtihad of the Imams was between taking and giving, rejection and acceptance, even among their companions, until Taqlid spread in the middle of the fourth century, and sectarian fanaticism began to lay eggs and hatch. No century came after that except that it was more fitna-ridden, more abundant in Taqlid, and more severe in stripping trust from the hearts of men, until they became comfortable with leaving delving into the matter of religion, and saying: 'Indeed, we found our fathers upon a nation, and indeed we are guided by their footsteps'" [^42].

The phenomenon of Taqlid continued with all its negative repercussions over long centuries, and the Muslim mentality still suffers from forms of dependency and imitation to this day, even if the intensity of that phenomenon seemed to subside from time to time, and its repercussions and causes varied [^43]. A number of scholars and historians spoke in their writings about the pests that the Ummah was exposed to due to Taqlid and fanaticism. History and biography books [^44] preserved many fitnas and trials, and fanaticism reached the point of killing, destruction, looting, and robbery among the followers of schools who were fanatical about the opinions of their schools and Imams. Al-San'ani says regarding this: "It is regrettable, saddening, and shameful that the oppressive imitative ember has not been extinguished until now among the followers of schools in many countries. If the matter were in their hands, they would have taken the jizya (tribute) from the followers of other schools, as Muhammad ibn Musa al-Balasaghuni, the innovator and judge of Damascus who died in 506 AH, said: 'If I had authority, I would take the jizya from the Shafi'is.' The heart breaks with sadness and sorrow over their satisfaction with that great calamity and deafening disaster that scattered the Ummah's unity in the worst way in the past and will tear it apart in the future in the worst manner" [^45].

Thus, Muslim societies across their different times and historical periods inherited the legacies of Taqlid and its pests alongside the remnants of the eras they passed through with all their suffering, political and intellectual outputs, and deteriorating accumulations. Intellectual stagnation and inertia prevailed, and the garb of Taqlid and fanaticism became common. Taqlid, which is among the most dangerous innovations, became a prevailing method and a familiar, dominant current [^46]. Jurists devoted themselves to patching and collecting, and most of their attempts did not depart from the path of Taqlid and intellectual stagnation. Circumstantial, historical, and political accumulations became a hardened shell obscuring the essence of religion and its pure teachings.

Social Motives for Taqlid:

Specific factors did not act alone in forming and reinforcing the phenomenon of Taqlid; rather, many of them collaborated in formulating that phenomenon and spreading its pests. Social factors are considered among the first and most important of those motives for the emergence and spread of Taqlid. The social structure is considered the first and most important cradle for the individual personality. No matter the personal brilliance and intellectual genius, it remains within the framework of the society's structure. This does not mean belittling the value of the role played by individuals among mujtahids, Imams, and great figures in history, but all of that remains within the social structure. Also, this does not mean that society absorbs the individual entirely and determines their behavior by imposing the power of social obligation; for the human being is the only living creature that is influenced by and influences the social at the same time [^47]. The influence of the social milieu and environment on individuals is a known matter; individuals in general are material capable of being shaped according to the prevailing conditions in every society.

Psychologists and sociologists agree that the human being is civil by nature, meaning subject to the general influence of the society's atmosphere. Also, they are in constant inclination to connect with the group by the nature of their formation to satisfy the natural innate needs upon which the human was created [^48]. From here, psychologists explained the phenomenon of the generation and spread of legends and stories furthest from correctness in different groups, finding that the individual's excessive readiness to receive from their society and environment and their extreme influence by that reception lies behind that spread. Human life is based on simulation and imitation; by this, generations in all nations continue, inheriting creeds, conceptions, values, customs, patterns of thinking, and forms of behavior no matter the degree of error or correctness they reach. From here, the authority of traditions over groups cannot be denied [^49].

As for objective perception, it consists of exceptional cases reached only by a very limited number of people. These few are the source of renewal, development, elevation, and civilizational emergence; without them, dull traditions remain stagnant and hovering [^50]. Also, social structures often give a sense of loyalty to ideas that are historically the first to leak into minds and intellects. The human mind is led by the earliest information and is often shaped by first impressions. This explains the motives for the continuity of Taqlid as an intellectual method among members of society and its transmission generation after generation, despite all the pests and harms it carries that are not hidden.

Al-Ghazali (505 AH) expressed this loyalty to the earliest in the context of his discussion on the obstacles to knowledge and truth, saying: "...the obedient one who conquers his desires and strips his thought for a truth among truths might not have that (i.e., the truth) revealed to him because he is veiled from it by a belief that preceded him since childhood by way of Taqlid and acceptance with good faith. That stands between him and the reality of the truth, and prevents the opposite of what he received from the outward of Taqlid from being revealed in his heart. This is also a great veil, by which most theologians and partisans of schools were veiled, rather, most of the righteous who contemplate the kingdom of the heavens and the earth, because they are veiled by imitative beliefs that solidified in their souls, became rooted in their hearts, and became a veil between them and the perception of realities" [^51].

The earliest information remains more dominant over minds, and what it requires to exit those minds is a long time. Accordingly, the delay of groups behind scholars and philosophers by several generations in the field of ideas is explained [^52]. Pierre Mannoni says in this context: "Prejudices and stereotypes also mediate social life; both are expressions of ideas by which individuals acknowledge their belonging to a certain rank and their implicit affiliation to judgments circulating in the group which is their reference... they represent the psychological content that this individual owes to the ideas of others and which he often inherits despite himself" [^53]. Mannoni emphasizes that information and prejudices or stereotypes act as social cement that prevents reaching the new which might carry within it much correctness, truth, and rationality.

The individual in a group acquires, by virtue of number, a sense of ability to undertake behaviors they would not have done while alone. This is due to the disappearance of the sense of responsibility that always restrains individuals. The philosopher Gustave Le Bon clarifies this meaning, saying: "The most prominent thing in the psychological group is that the individuals who compose it, no matter who they are and no matter how similar or different they are in their way of life, work, character, and intellect, is that if they turn into a group, this group grants them a type of collective spirit. This collective spirit makes them feel, think, and proceed in a way that differs from what each of them feels, thinks, and proceeds upon while alone..." [^54]. The group is not asked about its actions because they are common among all individuals, so none of them feels what the work might bring upon him of consequence, and this is the restrainer for souls from what is inappropriate [^55]. If the individual were isolated from his group in taking a certain stance, he would review himself in what he does and would strongly refrain from what he does while being swept away with the general current. The reference for all of that is the weakness of the individual's sense of responsibility; he is an individual in a massive gathering of people [^56].

Accordingly, a sense of fear is generated among individuals from departing from this general current or facing it, and the subsequent ganging up of the public. This feeling contributed to creating a state of terror in the souls of those who try to confront the prevailing current of Taqlid. That fear led many of the mujtahid Imams of the schools to remain silent about their attribution to one of the schools, despite the fact that they were mujtahids, not imitators. This was only due to the increase in psychological pressure coming from the commoners upon them. Al-Qanuji (1307 AH) expresses that state, saying: "The authors of sectarian biographical layers (tabaqat) were fanatical in counting the people of their sect, as they included in it those who were not of them. Most of the Imams of the schools are not imitators even if they were attributed to some of them; rather, they are mujtahids who chose for themselves the best statements and most rightful rulings after looking and Ijtihad. Counting them in the ranks of the imitators for the slightest partnership in knowledge is not fair at all. They only feared the fitna of the commoners in claiming Ijtihad or not accounting for Taqlid, so they were patient with their attribution to one of those schools" [^57].

Al-Shawkani expressed that terrible state of fear and terror that afflicts whoever tried to depart from the prevailing current of Taqlid, saying: "As for in these times, we have realized among them those who are more fanatical than others. If they hear of a man claiming Ijtihad and taking his religion from the Book of Allah and the Sunnah of His Messenger ﷺ, they rise against him in a way that the eyes of Islam weep over. They permit regarding him what they do not permit regarding the people of the Dhimma (protected non-Muslims) of slandering, cursing, labeling as sinful (tafsiq), denouncing, and attacking him in his home, stoning him with rocks, and violating his sanctity. You know for certain that if it were not for their restraint by the whip of the Caliphate's awe—may Allah strengthen its pillars and solidify its authority—they would have permitted shedding the blood of the scholars attributed to the Book and Sunnah and done to them what they do not do to the people of the Dhimma. We have witnessed of this what the space does not suffice to elaborate upon" [^58].

This motive explains the situations that a number of scholars were exposed to, reaching the point of insult and maltreatment by the commoners. There was no reason behind all of that except the departure of these scholars from the sweeping flood of Taqlid and its dominant general trend. The suffering of the mujtahids did not stop at the commoners only, but also came from some scholars in their eras who favored the method of Taqlid and followed it. This is clearly seen in the biographies of mujtahid scholars and the statements of their opponents among those who were their contemporaries or those who came after them. These had no crime except Ijtihad, calling to it, and opposing the prevailing imitative path [^59]. Professor Madkur says in this context: "Scholars feared critiquing their colleagues as a result of moral weakness. If one of them knocked on the door of Ijtihad, they would pounce on him, and a group of these would attack him either out of imagined religious fervor or out of jealousy and malice" [^60].

Accordingly, many reformers, callers, and scholars were unable to depart from the framework of their era, whether in conception, method, or both. They leaned toward social conformity instead of changing what should be changed of ideas and customs contrary to religion and methods opposed to sound thought. Few of them have sufficient courage to challenge the obstacles that face them, departing from the familiar and habit and going along with public opinion [^61].

Among the causes that contributed to reinforcing the phenomenon of Taqlid in society as well is the influence of deep collective feeling on individuals performing practices and behaviors they might not undertake alone. These cases may reach their peak and extreme intensity to the degree that psychologists call it: "collective feeling hysteria." It is a type of mania for collective participation through which the depths of the soul flourish, forming a type of undisciplined reactions. Thus, the ideas and general opinions of the group remain far from the oversight of reason, protected by familiarity and repetition, safe from analysis and review. Accordingly, the phenomenon of Taqlid remained far from review and critique after it became a collective phenomenon and a familiar, prevailing current. Human societies remain holding onto what they inherited of customs and manifestations, what they are used to of interests, and what they have practiced of trends... Abandoning the familiar resembles in its difficulty the attempt to uproot a rope from its place, even if this familiar is the source of misery. This is a matter confirmed by countless historical facts; no transition from a lower civilizational stage to a higher civilizational stage occurred except that it was accompanied by continuous difficult labors, and the stories of the Prophets (peace be upon them) with their peoples testify to that.

Accordingly, Ibn al-Qayyim says, expressing the state of Taqlid prevailing in his era: "...the one who holds fast to the Book and Sunnah is, according to them, a 'literalist' (sahib zawahir), deprived of his share of the rational; and the imitator of contradictory, conflicting opinions and collapsing ideas is, according to them, the virtuous and accepted one. The people of the Book and Sunnah who give precedence to their texts over others are, according to them, ignorant and deficient" [^62].

Intellectual Motives for Taqlid:

The human mind's ability for production and creativity is a massive, great ability. However, the teachings of the Holy Quran intended for this ability to be common and not restricted to scientific elites and genius mentalities known to history. From here, the first virtuous centuries of Islamic history were a true mirror and a faithful reflection of those Quranic teachings and Prophetic instructions. The atmospheres of those centuries contributed to stimulating intellectual and scientific activity and besieging ignorance in its various patterns and forms. That stage in history witnessed growing innovations and massive experiences in various fields and in all human sciences and knowledge, indicating the ability of the entire Ummah for contribution, development, civilizational addition, and providing the new in various paths of life. Perhaps the massive works left by scholars in those eras in all sciences and knowledge are the best witness and indicator of those massive abilities produced by the Ummah in those eras.

Fiqh descended into the field of life, exerted influence, added, and gave. It shaped the details of Islamic life in society, brought the requirements of Sharia to the heart of reality, and reformulated them according to the objectives and teachings of the Law. It granted Islamic civilization the ability for communication, renewal, and contribution. The massive works and classifications reflected the interaction of the predecessor scholars—may Allah have mercy on them—with the reality of their eras and times and the issues of their societies. The favorable atmospheres—as we referred to them earlier—contributed to formulating and reinforcing that methodology and implementing it. The goodness of the predecessors' faculties in education, crafts, and all conditions was reflected in their works, indicating a sharp intelligence, solid thought, and original Ijtihad in a cognitively integrated system.

Later generations inherited those various works and classifications, so they devoted themselves to studying and acquiring them. Through all of that, they witnessed the predecessors' massive abilities in coexisting and responding to their reality, until the later ones thought that this was a difference in human reality between them and the predecessors [^63]. The illusion of that difference was expressed in various forms, perhaps the most prominent of which was the claim of inability to perform Ijtihad. Ambitions were directed toward understanding what was transmitted from the predecessor scholars of texts and rules in the loci of rulings. Interest turned to memorizing and reciting those classifications and commentaries; thus, dialogue was confined to those recorded classifications and works, without attempting to read them through opening paths of dialogue and discussion about what was contained in them, or reviewing them in light of the changes occurring and increasing developments in issues and rulings.

The nature of the general atmospheres and political and social conditions contributed to reinforcing all of that through attempts to silence voices and close methods of dialogue and debate, in contrast to what the previous virtuous centuries witnessed. The effect of scientific dialogue and debate—characterized by the specifications of calm Islamic dialogue—in stimulating, sharpening, and training the faculty of science and learning is not hidden. Loosening the tongue through dialogue and debate in scientific issues is considered among the easiest ways to acquire the faculty of science and learning; it is what brings its matter closer and achieves its goal. From here, silence and avoidance of dialogue and the cancellation of the scientific debate method prevailed over the councils of science and education in those eras, despite their abundance and diversity.

Ibn Khaldun says in describing that state and its effects on the human mentality and its aptitude for learning: "You find the student of knowledge among them, having spent their lives attending scientific councils, silent, not speaking or discussing. Their concern with memorization is more than needed, so they do not obtain much of the faculty of disposal in science and teaching. Then, after the acquisition by one who sees that he has acquired, you find his faculty deficient in his science if he discusses, debates, or teaches. The deficiency only came to them from the side of teaching and the interruption of its chain; otherwise, their memorization is more profound than the memorization of others due to their extreme concern with it, and their thought that it is the intended goal of the scientific faculty, which is not the case" [^64].

What is worth noting in this regard is the importance of distinguishing and differentiating between the purposeful scientific dialogue that characterized the previous virtuous eras, and the polemics and disagreement that arose and spread in later eras. The latter was not intended to show the truth or follow it, but for arrogance and gaining favor before rulers and ministers. Councils were held for that before ministers and rulers for the purpose of overcoming and boasting, as Al-Ghazali (may Allah have mercy on him) elaborated on their state in the pests of polemics and debate [^65].

In Ibn Khaldun's speech is an indication that focusing on the ability for memorization and recitation without attempting to care for developing the rest of the intellectual abilities with which Allah, Glorified and Exalted, provided the human being, is a matter that has many negative effects. A human might have the ability to store and retrieve information, but not have the ability to analyze, understand, or evaluate it. Accordingly, those eras witnessed the beginning of concern with narration and transmission by teachers and stopping at memorization and recitation by students in various fields, especially the field of Fiqh and Sharia sciences. This was accompanied by an abundance of works and classifications, as Ibn Khaldun pointed out, saying: "Know that among what harmed people in acquiring science and reaching its goals is the abundance of authorship, the difference in terminology in teaching, and the multiplicity of its methods, then demanding the learner and student to recall all of that; only then is the position of acquisition granted to him. Thus, the learner needs to memorize all or most of them and observe their methods, and his life does not suffice for what was written in one craft if he dedicated himself to it. So deficiency occurs, and he inevitably falls below the rank of acquisition. An example of that is the state of Fiqh in the Maliki school with the codified books, for example, and the jurisprudential commentaries written upon them" [^66].

Thus, interest in education turned to memorization and recitation without attempting to go deep or analyze and understand what came in them, and subsequently attempting to perform a critical reading of them. It is not hidden that interest in a specific intellectual ability and its development and focusing on it while neglecting other abilities is considered among the most important factors for the atrophy of those abilities, especially in the absence of using those powers. Stagnation and inertia prevailed over the statements and opinions of the predecessors. Fiqh no longer had its previous effect in shaping life, harmonizing with its developments, treating its problems, and providing effective solutions for them. The ability for Ijtihad and interaction with the developments of life and organizing them according to the method of the Book and Sunnah disappeared.

Despite the contribution of a number of scholars with a significant share in attempting to stimulate the scientific movement and classifying a large number of works, most of them fluctuated between elaboration, commentary, and abbreviation with little depth and creativity. All of this is due to the dominance of the current of Taqlid over the general scholars, and fanaticism for the schools prevailing in every region or environment. Most jurists restrict themselves to the school of their Imam, hardly departing from it even in its branches. The peak of their effort is investigating the weightier opinions within the school without departing from their Imam's opinion or statements, due to their belief that their Imam is absolutely correct. Accordingly, they forbade Ijtihad for others under the pretext of inability to reach the rank of mujtahids at all. Thus, absolute Ijtihad that proceeds from the original sources of legislation represented in the Book and Sunnah without being restricted to a specific school was almost non-existent. The outputs and statements of previous scholars were applied to the reality of life for eras they did not witness, and to conditions and variables they did not experience, without realization of the change that occurred in conditions and the great risks that could result from that.

Ibn Khaldun says regarding this: "Analogy and simulation are a known nature for the human being, and from error they are not safe; they take him out, with distraction and negligence, from his purpose, and deviate him from his goal. A listener might hear many reports of the past ones and not realize the change of conditions and their reversal, so he tries them at first glance on what he knows, and measures them by what he witnessed, while the difference between them might be great, so he falls into a pit of error" [^67].

In light of those prevailing intellectual atmospheres, Taqlid prevailed and grew, and was confined...

Footnotes:

[^1]: PhD in Usul al-Fiqh, Assistant Professor in the Department of Islamic Studies at the University of Bahrain.
[^2]: Muhammad ibn Abi Bakr al-Razi, Mukhtar al-Sahah, ed. Mahmoud Khater, Librairie du Liban Publishers, Beirut, 1415 AH / 1995 AD, p. 229. See also Ahmad ibn Muhammad al-Fayyumī, Al-Misbah al-Munir, Al-Maktaba al-'Ilmiyya, Beirut, n.d., p. 512, 513.
[^3]: Ali ibn Muhammad al-Jurjani, Al-Ta'rifat, ed. Ibrahim al-Abyari, Dar al-Kitab al-Arabi, Beirut, 1405 AH, vol. 1, p. 590.
[^4]: For definitions of Taqlid by Usuliyyun, see: Abu al-Ma'ali Abd al-Malik ibn Abdullah al-Juwayni, Al-Burhan fi Usul al-Fiqh, ed. Abd al-Azim al-Deeb, Maktabat al-Wafa, Egypt, 4th ed., 1418 AH, vol. 2, p. 888; Abu Ishaq Ibrahim ibn Ali al-Shirazi, Al-Luma' fi Usul al-Fiqh, Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyya, Beirut, 1405 AH / 1985 AD, vol. 1, p. 120; Abdullah ibn Ahmad ibn Qudama al-Maqdisi, Rawdat al-Nazir, ed. Abd al-Aziz al-Sa'id, Imam Muhammad ibn Saud University, Riyadh, 2nd ed., 1399 AH, vol. 1, p. 382; Abu al-Muzaffar Mansur ibn Muhammad al-Sam'ani, Qawati' al-Adilla fi al-Usul, ed. Muhammad Hassan al-Shafi'i, Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyya, Beirut, 1997 AD, vol. 2, p. 340.
[^5]: Abu al-Ma'ali Abd al-Malik ibn Abdullah al-Juwayni, Al-Ijtihad, ed. Abd al-Hamid Abu Zunayd, Dar al-Qalam, Beirut, 1408 AH, vol. 1, p. 97.
[^6]: Abu al-Muzaffar Mansur ibn Muhammad al-Sam'ani, Qawati' al-Adilla fi al-Usul, ed. Muhammad Hassan al-Shafi'i, Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyya, Beirut, 1997 AD, vol. 2, p. 340.
[^7]: Some Usuliyyun use the word rahma (mercy) to mean Taqlid.
[^8]: Al-Sam'ani, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 340.
[^9]: Al-Juwayni, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 96; Muhammad ibn Ali al-Shawkani, Irshad al-Fuhul, ed. Muhammad al-Badri, Dar al-Fikr, Beirut, 1412 AH / 1992 AD, vol. 1, p. 444.
[^10]: See all these definitions in: Muhammad ibn Ali al-Shawkani, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 442, 443.
[^11]: Abu Shama Abd al-Rahman al-Maqdisi, Mukhtasar al-Mu'ammal, ed. Salah al-Din Maqbul, Dar al-Sahwa al-Islamiyya, Kuwait, 1403 AH, vol. 1, p. 68.
[^12]: Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, I'lam al-Muwaqqi'in 'an Rabb al-'Alamin, ed. Taha Sa'd, Dar al-Jil, Beirut, 1973 AD, vol. 2, p. 236.
[^13]: Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 263.
[^14]: Al-Shawkani, Fath al-Qadir, Dar al-Fikr, Beirut, vol. 2, p. 199.
[^15]: Op. cit., vol. 2, p. 412.
[^16]: Al-Shawkani, Fath al-Qadir, vol. 4, p. 45.
[^17]: Taqlid is not permissible according to the majority of Usuliyyun in creeds ('aqa'id), such as the existence of Allah the Almighty, His Oneness, the obligation of singling Him out for worship, and knowing the truthfulness of His Messenger ﷺ. For these, they hold that sound investigation, reflection, and contemplation leading to knowledge and tranquility of the heart, and knowing the evidence for that, are necessary. Then, according to the majority, everything known from the religion by necessity is attached to creeds in this matter; there is no Taqlid in it, because knowledge of it is obtained through mass-transmission (tawatur) and consensus (Ijma'), such as adopting the five pillars of Islam. See: Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, op. cit., "Ruling on Taqlid."
[^18]: Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, I'lam al-Muwaqqi'in, vol. 2, p. 211; their prohibition was also transmitted by: Ibn Taymiyya, Kutub wa Rasa'il wa Fatawa Ibn Taymiyya fi al-Fiqh, ed. Abd al-Rahman al-Asimi, Maktabat Ibn Taymiyya, Saudi Arabia, vol. 20, p. 211; see also Al-Shawkani, Irshad al-Fuhul, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 449; Ibn Hazm, Al-Nubdha al-Kafiya, ed. Muhammad Ahmad Abd al-Aziz, Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyya, Beirut, 1405 AH, vol. 1, p. 72.
[^19]: Abu Abdullah Muhammad ibn Ahmad al-Qurtubi, Tafsir al-Qurtubi, ed. Ahmad Abd al-Alim al-Barduni, Dar al-Sha'b, Cairo, 2nd ed., 1372 AH, vol. 1, p. 231.
[^20]: Muhammad ibn Ali al-Shawkani, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 167.
[^21]: Al-Shawkani, Fath al-Qadir, vol. 2, p. 353; see also: Abu Muhammad Ali ibn Ahmad ibn Hazm, Al-Nubdha al-Kafiya fi Usul al-Fiqh, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 71 ff. For scholars' aversion to Taqlid, see Al-Juwayni, Al-Burhan fi Usul al-Fiqh, vol. 2, p. 625.
[^22]: Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, I'lam al-Muwaqqi'in, vol. 2, p. 190 ff; see also for providing evidence on the prohibition of Taqlid: Salih ibn Muhammad al-Umari, Iykaz al-Himam, Dar al-Ma'rifa, Beirut, 1398 AH, vol. 1, p. 35.
[^23]: Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, I'lam al-Muwaqqi'in, vol. 2, pp. 194-195.
[^24]: Al-Shawkani, Irshad al-Fuhul, vol. 1, p. 446.
[^25]: Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, I'lam al-Muwaqqi'in, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 198.
[^26]: Shah Waliullah al-Dehlawi, Al-Insaf fi Masa'il al-Khilaf, ed. Abd al-Fattah Abu Ghudda, Dar al-Nafa'is, Beirut, 2nd ed., 1984 AD, p. 99; Siddiq ibn Hassan al-Qanuji, Abjad al-Ulum, ed. Abd al-Jabbar Zakkar, Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyya, Beirut, 1978 AD, vol. 2, p. 403.
[^27]: See this meaning in: Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, I'lam al-Muwaqqi'in 'an Rabb al-'Alamin, vol. 1, p. 6.
[^28]: Muhammad ibn Isma'il al-San'ani, Irshad al-Nuqqad ila Taysir al-Ijtihad, ed. Salah al-Din Maqbul, Al-Dar al-Salafiyya, Kuwait, 1405 AH, vol. 1, p. 14.
[^29]: Muhammad Mustafa Shalabi, Al-Madkhal fi al-Ta'rif bi al-Fiqh al-Islami, Dar al-Nahda al-Arabiyya, Beirut, 1405 AH / 1985 AD, p. 129 ff.
[^30]: Muhammad Faruq al-Nabhan, Al-Madkhal li al-Tashri' al-Islami, Wakalat al-Matbu'at, Kuwait, 2nd ed., 1981, p. 123 ff.
[^31]: Nicholson, Literary History of the Arabs, Cambridge, 1930, p. 281.
[^32]: Ignaz Goldziher, Madhahib al-Tafsir al-Islami, trans. Abd al-Halim al-Najjar, Maktabat al-Khanji, Egypt, and Maktabat al-Muthanna, Baghdad, 1955-1974, p. 3.
[^33]: Suhayl Farah, Al-Falsafa al-Arabiyya al-Mu'asira, Center for Arab Unity Studies, 1988, p. 263.
[^34]: Muhammad Iqbal, Tajdid al-Tafkir al-Dini fi al-Islam, trans. Abbas Mahmoud, Committee for Authorship, Translation, and Publication, Cairo, 2nd ed., 1986 AD, pp. 189-190.
[^35]: Abu Shama Abd al-Rahman al-Maqdisi, Mukhtasar al-Mu'ammal, ed. Salah al-Din Maqbul, Maktabat al-Sahwa al-Islamiyya, Kuwait, 1403 AH, vol. 1, p. 41.
[^36]: Abd al-Rahman ibn Khaldun, Al-Muqaddimah, Dar al-Qalam, Beirut, 1984, vol. 2, p. 493.
[^37]: See: Ahmad Amin, Duha al-Islam, Maktabat al-Nahda al-Misriyya, 8th ed., n.d., vol. 1, p. 49; Hamilton A.R. Gibb, Studies on the Civilization of Islam, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1982, p. 69. Zandaqa (heresy) is applied to several meanings, including decadence, debauchery, and boastful speech that touches upon religion, skeptical and suspicious tendencies, and following the Manichaean religion while outwardly professing Islam. Zandaqa spread in that era and was promoted by several authors of Persian origin who were unable to abandon their past and the traces of their ancient religions. For more, see: Sourdel Dominique and Janine, La Civilisation de l'Islam Classique, trans. into Arabic, Dar al-Haqiqa, Beirut, 1980 AD, p. 123; Ahmad Amin, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 123.
[^38]: Regarding those writings, see: Ahmad ibn Abd al-Halim ibn Taymiyya, Majmu' Fatawa Shaykh al-Islam, compiled by Ibn Qasim, Saudi Arabia, 1398 AH / 1978 AD, vol. 20, p. 392.
[^39]: Regarding the emergence of Taqlid, see Ibn al-Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 7.
[^40]: Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, I'lam al-Muwaqqi'in, vol. 2, p. 208.
[^41]: Muhammad ibn Isma'il al-San'ani, Irshad al-Nuqqad, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 23.
[^42]: Several scholars hold that Taqlid has continued since the 4th or beginning of the 5th century until today. Muhammad ibn al-Hassan al-Hajwi, Al-Fikr al-Sami fi Tarikh al-Fiqh al-Islami, commentary by Abd al-Aziz al-Qari, Al-Maktaba al-Ilmiyya, Medina, 1397 AH / 1977 AD, vol. 2, part 4, p. 163.
[^43]: Abd al-Hayy ibn Ahmad al-Dimashqi, Shadharat al-Dhahab fi Akhbar Man Dhahab, Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyya, Beirut, n.d., vol. 2, p. 188.
[^44]: Al-San'ani, Irshad al-Nuqqad, vol. 1, p. 23 ff.
[^45]: Ibn Hazm, Al-Ihkam fi Usul al-Ahkam, op. cit., vol. 6, p. 292.
[^46]: The sociologist Durkheim attempted to explain how the society's influence is transmitted to the individual and determines their behavior by emphasizing the determinism of social phenomena and imposing the power of social obligation. See: Muhammad Sa'id Faraj, Al-Bina' al-Ijtima'i wa al-Shakhsiyya, Dar al-Ma'rifa al-Jami'iyya, Egypt, 1989 AD, p. 8 ff.
[^47]: This is what Aristotle mentioned and sociologists considered a classical axiom: that man is a social and civil animal, meaning he does not live and cannot be studied in isolation from society. Ahmad al-Khashab, Al-Tafkir al-Ijtima'i, Dar al-Nahda al-Arabiyya, Beirut, n.d., p. 133.
[^48]: Gustave Le Bon, The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind (Arabic trans. Ruh al-Jama'at by Adil Zu'aytir), Dar al-Ma'arif, Egypt, 1955 AD, p. 78. See also by the author: The Psychology of Peoples (Arabic trans. Ruh al-Ijtima' by Ahmad Fathi Zaghlul Pasha), Matba'at al-Sha'b, Egypt, 1909, p. 59.
[^49]: See Ibrahim al-Buleihi, Riyadh Book Forum website.
[^50]: Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, Ihya' Ulum al-Din, Dar al-Ma'rifa, Beirut, vol. 3, p. 14.
[^51]: Gustave Le Bon, Ruh al-Ijtima', op. cit., p. 61.
[^52]: Pierre Mannoni, Collective Psychology (Arabic trans. Ilm al-Nafs al-Jama'i), Interpress Publishing, Cyprus, n.d., p. 78 ff.
[^53]: Gustave Le Bon, op. cit., p. 30.
[^54]: Gustave Le Bon, Ruh al-Ijtima', op. cit., p. 21.
[^55]: Fu'ad al-Bahi al-Sayyid and Sa'd Abd al-Rahman, Ilm al-Nafs al-Ijtima'i, Dar al-Fikr al-Arabi, Egypt, 1999 AD, p. 75.
[^56]: Al-Qanuji, Abjad al-Ulum, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 405.
[^57]: Al-Shawkani, Al-Qawl al-Mufid, vol. 1, p. 66.
[^58]: Awad Allah Jad Hijazi, Ibn al-Qayyim wa Mawqifuhu min al-Tafkir al-Islami, Dar al-Tiba'a al-Muhammadiyya, Egypt, 1380 AH / 1960 AD, pp. 38-39.
[^59]: Muhammad Salam Madkur, Manahij al-Ijtihad fi al-Islam, Kuwait University, 1973, vol. 1, part 2, p. 415.
[^60]: Ibrahim Aqili, Takamul al-Manhaj al-Ma'rifi 'inda Ibn Taymiyya, International Institute of Islamic Thought, USA, 1415 AH / 1994 AD, p. 63.
[^61]: Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Madarij al-Salikin, ed. Muhammad Hamid al-Fiqi, Dar al-Kitab al-Arabi, 2nd ed., Beirut, 1973, vol. 1, p. 5.
[^62]: See what Ibn Khaldun said about the difference between urban and desert dwellers: "When the urbanite is filled with crafts, their faculties, and the goodness of their teaching, he thinks that everyone who falls short of those faculties does so due to a deficiency in his intellect, and that the souls of the desert people are deficient by their nature." vol. 1, p. 433.
[^63]: Ibn Khaldun, Al-Muqaddimah, vol. 1, pp. 431-432.
[^64]: Al-Hajwi, op. cit., vol. 2, part 3, p. 144 ff.
[^65]: Ibn Khaldun, vol. 1, p. 531.
[^66]: Ibn Khaldun, vol. 1, p. 29.
[^67]: Ibn Khaldun, vol. 1, p. 29. (